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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. ALBUQUERQUE
NATIONAL BANE v. PEREA.1
TerritorialCourts-Appointment ofjudgesfor a Term of Years.
It was implied in the decision of the Court in this case that the territorial Supreme Court of New Mexico, established by Act of Congress,
was a Constitutional Court of the United States, though its judges were
appointed by the President for a term of years, and not during good
behavior.
THE UNITED STATES TEnRRIToIAi, COURTS AND THE TEiRm OF THE

JUDICIA, OFFICE.
The principle stated in the above
syllabus, which was implied in the
decision, rather than expressly decided in the above case, has at the
present time no direct practical
interest. That judges of territorial
courts do not have to be "appointed
during good behavior." in order to
make the territorial court constitutional, has been too long acquiesced in to be now disputed. Indirectly, however, an examination
of the reasons which led the courts
to declare territorial courts constitutional, even though the judges
held office for a definite term of
years, is of great practical importance in connection with the legislative question of how to improve
the Interstate Commerce Commission. If the Commission should be
given the functions of a court,
would its members have to be ap
pointed for life? It is taken for
granted, in the discussions on the
present powers of the commission,
that if the commission should be
1 13 Sup. C.

Note, infra,372.

made a court, then the life tenure
of its judges would be a necessary
consequence. Yet since we have
before us the object lesson of territorial courts established by Acts
of Congress, whose judges are
appointed for a term of years, it
would be well to pause and see if
the same line of reasoning which
makes territorial courts, constitutional in the eyes of the Supreme
Court might not be also made to
uphold the, constitutionality of a
commission turned into a court,
although its judges only sat for a
term of years.
The first section of the third
article of the Constitution says:
"The judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.
The judges, both of the supreme
and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behavior."
The validity of territorial courts

Rep., 194. Decided January 3, 1893.
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was first involved in that celebrated
decision by Chief Justice MARfirst upheld the
SHALL, which
power of the United States to acquire and govern territory. We
mean the case of The American
Insurance Company v. Canter, I
Pet., 511. Goods had been sold
under a judgment of a court created
by the territorial legislature of
Florida, which legislation was
within the power vested by Congress in the territory. The judges
were not appointed for life, as
neither were the judges of the
superior courts of Florida as established by Congress. Of the latter
courts the Chief Justice says:
"These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the
constitutional power conferred by
the Constitution on the general
government can be deposited.
They are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative courts, created
by virtue of the general right of
sovereignty which exists in the
government, or in virtue of that
clause which enables Congress to
make all =eedfnl rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The
jurisdiction with which they are
invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the
third article of the Constitution,
but is conferred by Congress in the
execution of those general powers
which that body possesses over
the territories ofthe United States."
Then he adds: "Though admiralty
jurisdiction can be exercised in the
States in those courts only which
are established in pursuance, of the
third article of the Constitution,
the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them Congress exercises
the combined powers of the general

and State governments." Theidea
of MARSHALL was that the framers
of the Constitution were in the
third article only providing for the
judicial power of the Federal as
distinguished from the State governments, and that, while in prbviding that the United States could
make treaties and carry on war,
they impliedly permitted the Federal government to acquire and
govern territory outside the States,
nevertheless they failed to lay
down any rule for the administr~ion of the judicial functions of
a government in such territory,
and, therefore, Congress in providing courts for the territories was
left free to make the tenure of the
judicial office what they would.
This theory has been silently
acquiesced in ever since. Besides,
on rare occasions, when opportunity
offered, members of the Supreme
Court have expressly adopted the
same reasoning. Thus in Brenner
v. Porter, 9 How., 242, which was
decided in 185o, Mr Justice NELSON says: "The distinction between
Federal and State jurisdictions
under the Constitution of the
United States has no foundation in
these territorial governments, and
consequently no such distinction
exists, either in respect to the jurisdiction of their courts or the subjects submitted to their cognizance.
They are legislative governments,
and their courts legislative courts;
Congress, in the exercise of its
powers in the organization and
government of the territories, combine the powers of both Federal
and State authorities. . . They
(the Territorial Courts) are not
organized under the Constitution
nor subject to its complex distribution of the powers of government."
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And again: "The territorial
courts were not courts in which the
judicial power conferred by the
Constitution could be deposited.
They were incapable of receiving
it, as the tenure of the incumbents
was but for four years. Neither
were they organized by Congress
under the Constitution, as they
were invested with powers and
jurisdiction which that bbdy was
incapiable of conferring upon a
Courtwithin the limitsof a State."
So, also, Chief Justice CHASB, in
Clinton v. Englebrecht, I3 Wal.,
447 (.87I), says: "There is no
Supreme Court of the United
States, nor is there any District
Court of the United States, in the
sense of the Constitution, in the
Territory of Utah. The judges are
not appointed for the same terms,
nor is the jurisdiction which they
exercise part of the judicial power
conferred -by the Constitution on
the general government The courts
are legislative courts of the territory, created in virtue of the clause
which authorizes Congress to make
all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territories of the
United States."
In accordance
with this opinion, we find that the
learned jurist considers it would be
perfectly consistent for Congress to
permit the judges of the territorial
courts to be elected by the people
of the territory and commissioned
by the governor. The court decided in this case that juries of
territorial courts summoned under
Acts which apply only to district
courts of the United States are
wrongly summoned, and a cballenge to the array ought to be
allowed. That territorial courts
were not district courts was also
held by Chief Justice WAirrHin
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.,
of p. 154 (1878).

Of course, these territorial courts
not only decide questions which
arise under the acts of territorial
legislatures, but also questions arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and also admiralty cases. And yet such jurisdiction is constitutional, because, as
Mr. Justice CLIFFoRD, in the "City
of Panama," XoI U. S., 453 (1879),
460, says: "The jurisdiction with
which they are invested is not a
part of thejudicial power defined by
Article III of the Constitution, but.
is conferred by Congress under the
power which the legislative department possesses, to make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the
public territory and the other public property."
Were the question an open one
we would be strongly inclined to
the opinion that territorial courts
were courts of the United States
within the restriction imposed upon
Congress by Section I, Article III,
requiring that judges should be appointed during good behavior. The
article opens thus: "The judicial
power of the United States shall be
vested, etc." There is no qualification or limitation. All the judicial
power of the federal sovereignty is
vested in "one Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and estabChief Justice MARSHALL
lish."
himself, in the very case in which
he limited this article to the judicial
power of the United States exercised in the States, pointed out that
the right to govern a, territory not
included within the limits of any
State was necessarily vested in the
federal government, and contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. If this be so, they must
have contemplated the exercise by
the United States of judicial functions in the govei nment of such ter-
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ritory, and surely the fact that the
Constitution omits to make any exception to the rule that judges
should be appointed during good
behavior, coupled with the fact that
it is perfectly possible for judges to
be so appointed in the territory, is
strong presumptive evidence that
such would have been the more
consistent interpretation of the
Constitution. Because, in the territories the central government combines the functions of the State
and federal governments, and that
does not make the laws of a territorial legislature, made in pursuance of the authority invested in
them by Congress, any less laws of
the United States.
True, it maybe argued that if we
think Congress cannot, in the territories, establish courts in any
other manner than that required
by Article III, so also we should
deny to Congress the power of
legislating in the territories in any
other way than by direct acts
passed by eongress, because the
opening section of Article I is even
stronger than the opening words of
Article III in confining the legislative power of the United States to
the Congress of the United States.
There would be great force in such
an objection if it was not a necessary rule of constitutional construction that the terms of the instrument should never be construed as
mutually contradictory.
In the
power to govern a territory of the
United States there is necessarily
the ppwer to govern it entirely and
completely. That a Federal legislature can satisfactorily make police
regulations for a locality cannot be
admitted in interpreting the constitution of a county which is based on
the idea that the locality, as far as
consistent with the welfare of the

whole people, should govern itself.
Therefore, while Congress cannot
delegate any of its authority to pass
general laws to any other body, in
as far as it has an authority to govern localities, it can provide for the
creation of bodies which shall exercise the powers of local legislation.
If there was any reason, in the
nature of things, why judges who
held their office during good behavior could not exercise judicial
functions in the territories, then,
as the Federal government has the
power to administer justice in the
territories, and it was not possible
to administer justice through courts
whose judges held during good behavior, we should say it was necessarily implied that Article III did
not deal with the exercise ofjudicial
functions to be exercised in the territory of the United States. But
there is no practical objection
which would conclusively prevent
a judge holding, for good behavior,
from administering justice in the
territories.
It is true that when
the territories become States the
territorial courts, as such, are abolished.
If the judge's office be
taken away there is no office. But
this is true of any court of the
United States except the Supreme
Court. Since Congress can "ordain and establish inferior courts,"
they can disestablish such courts.
The constitutional provision is
only that, as long as the court continues, the judges cannot be
removed in any other way except
by- impeachment. Whether the
court 7emaining a court, one of its
judges, as the office of presiding
judge, can be abolished, isamooted
question into which we need not
enter here.
Of cour-e, the abolition of a Federal court by Congress, and the immediate creation

